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ABSTRACT: The telecommunications industry in China has been experiencing
drastic restructuring and exponential growth over the last two decades. Digital
divides, however, are now broadened among various groups, particularly between
urban and rural areas. These divides pose an impediment to the goal of a
harmonious society as well as the Communist Party of China's recent ideology of
building "Socialist New Villages." This paper starts with a brief account of the
current status of universal service regulation and the unique circumstances
surrounding China. Next, this paper explores what seems to be a sustainable
institutional arrangement for universal service obligations ("USOs") in China in the
aftermath of China's accession into the WTO. Solutions to policy questions
regarding support mechanisms, regulatory governance, and the government's role in
each are identified. The paper concludes that the uniqueness of China's
circumstances requires a similarly unique solution to the USO issue. While a
universal service fund ("USF") has been a standard and successful mechanism
elsewhere in the world, it is probably currently unsuitable for China. Instead, a
regulatory approach featuring a "non-subsidy" policy can serve both interim and
long-term goals, and a regulatory governance system featuring a "joint-committee"
with members from various stakeholders can be one key solution to addressing
coordinative and agency problems.
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I. BACKGROUND AND STATUS QUO
A. THE COUNTRY
China is one of the most ancient nations in the world. China is
also a developing country with a land mass of 9.6 million square
kilometers, roughly one quarter of the Asian land area, ranking it the
third largest country on the planet.' The physical typography of the
land forms three ladders descending from west to east. These ladders
are diversified in terms of not only land terrain, but also socio-
economic development, weather conditions, and density of
population.2 The mountain and plateau areas that cover roughly 70%
of the country account for 66% of the land surface and are primarily
concentrated in western China. There are thirty-one provinces
(including municipalities directly controlled by the central government
and autonomous regions) and fifty-six ethnic nationalities with a total
population of roughly 1.3 billion (as of 2005), 3 skyrocketing from 0.45
billion in 1949 when the People's Republic was established.4 There
are 732.7 thousand rural administrative villages consisting of 5 million
"natural" villages. These villages contain 210 million rural households
and a rural population of 745 million, which accounts for 57% of the
total population.5 The exponential population growth was curbed by
the "Family Planning" program launched in the 1970s.6 However, due
to the large population base already formed, China's population will
still be growing at a high speed until 2050.
' See, e.g. Web site of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China
http://www.gov.cn/ (in Chinese) and http://english.gov.cn/. See also, e.g., the Official News
Web site of the State Council News Office of China, http://www.china.com.cn and
http://www.china.org.cn/english/index.htm (accessed Nov. 23, 2006).
2id.
3 See, e.g., National Bureau of Statistics of China, "China Statistical Yearbook 2005,"
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20060227_402307796.htm, and
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexeh.htm (in Chinese, accessed Nov. 23, 2006).
4id.
5 id.
6 Central People's Government Population Growth and Family Planning,
http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-07/26/content_17364.htm (in Chinese, accessed Nov. 23, 2006).
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During the past century, foreign invasions and civil wars drove
China into a deep economic depression and to the social turbulence
that lasted until the end of 1970s when the "Cultural Revolution"
officially ended.7 Since then, the Communist Party of China ("CPC")
adopted a reform and opening-up policy. The CPC decided in 1992 to
construct the so-called "Socialist Market Economy with Chinese
Characteristics," 8 which resulted in an exponential influx of foreign
capital and extensive reforms of SOEs (state-owned enterprises).
Mainland China's gross domestic product ("GDP") has grown at an
annual rate of 9% since 1978 (when the reform and opening-up policy
were initiated) to USD 2279 billion as of 2005, with a per capita GDP
of USD 1753. 9 Nevertheless, marked gaps in income exist between
urban and rural areas as well as between different regions. Until 2005,
average annual disposable income per capita for rural areas was USD
407 and USD 1311 for urban areas. GDP per capita is much higher in
relatively developed regions, e.g., Beijing has reached USD 5457,
whilst in some extremely deprived areas annual household income is
under USD 50.10
The government is comprised of the State Council, the National
People's Congress, and the National People's Political Consultative
Congress, all of whom report to CPC. 11 Hong Kong and Macao were
reunited with the mainland in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Currently,
the mainland economy is largely government-dominated in terms of
ownership as well as political intervention. 12 In the aftermath of entry
7 Central People's Government History, http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/06/content_24233.htm
(accessed Nov. 23, 2006).
8 Jiang Zemin "Speed-up the Steps in Reform, Opening-up and the Construction of
Modernization to Achieve More Triumphs in the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics" (speech, First Session of the CPC's 14th Congregation, October 12-18, 1992),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697148.htm (in Chinese); CPC Central
Committee, "The Decision on Various Issues Concerning Building Socialist Market Economic
System" (official document, 3rd Session of the 14th Congregation of the CPC, November 11-
14, 1993), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/5179/20010430/
456592.html (in Chinese).
9 National Bureau of Statistics of China, "China Statistical Yearbook 2005," supra note 3.
The author uses a nominal exchange rate of 8:1 here to convert the original RMB amount to
the USD figure.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. (government ownership accounts for roughly three quarter of the national capital stock).
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into the WTO in 2002, China's government is now taking more
initiative in further advancing economic reform and liberalizing
networked industries such as telecommunications, civil aviation,
railroad transportation, energy, and power.
B. TELECOM REFORM AND MARKET ENVIRONMENT
China initiated telecommunications deregulation in 1993, first
through the "opening up part of the [value-added service ("VAS")] for
competition" and then through the 1994 incorporation of China
Unicom.' 3 These actions were catalysts for the beginning of a series
of drastic structural changes and a governance transition that roughly
fell into three phases.
The first phase was signaled by the initial opening-up in 1993 and
is further symbolized by the entry of China Unicom in 1994.14 In
1993, the former Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications ("MPT")
deregulated "nine non-basic telecom services [that encompassed] radio
paging, 800 MHz trunk telephone service, 450MHz radio mobile
communications service, domestic VSAT service, telephony
information service, computer information service, electronic mail,
electronic data interchange, videotext, and other services at the MPT's
discretion."'15 Further, "[a]s a result, many small companies piled into
this lucrative market and grew rapidly." 6  The paging industry can
serve as an example as it was saturated within a few years of its initial
appearance.
"Following deregulation, China Unicom was formally incorporated
in 1994. The former Directorate General of Telecommunications
[("DGT")] of the MPT was also [incorporated] as a company under the
"3 Jun Xia, "Head-to-Head or Hand-in-Hand: Does Structural Reform Have Led to Meaningful
Competition in China?" (paper presented at the 34th Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference, George Mason University Law School, Arlington, Virginia,, USA), September
29-October 1, 2006), http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/586/Head-to-
Head%20or/o20Hand-in-Hand.pdf (accessed Jan. 7, 2007): 2.
14 See id. See also Jun Xia & Ting-jie Lu, "Universal Service Policy in China: Building
Digital Bridge for Rural Community" (paper presented at the 33rd Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference, George Mason University Law School, Arlington, Virginia, USA,
September 23-25, 2005); Guangbin Zhou, Reflections on China's Telecom Reform,
Communication Information News (Tong Xin Xin Xi Bao), July 3, 2002,
http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/t/2002-07-0 4/124204.shtml (in Chinese).
15 See Xia, "Head-to-Head or Hand-in-Hand," supra note 13, at 3.
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name of China Telecom."'17  China's government intended this
registration to be an initial step in separating government function
from business operation, thus ending up with a duopolistic telephony
market ("though China Unicorn later found that it was actually
competing with the regulator").' 8  China Unicorn, a share-holding
company, holds "investments from the former Ministry of Electronic
Industry [("MEI")], the Ministry of Railway, the Ministry of Electrical
Power, and 13 other large-scale state-owned institutions," including
the Chinese Academy of Science. 19 As for China Telecom, it did not
provide services or actually own any networks. Moreoever, "the
national network, including three international gateways at that time,
[was] owned and operated by provincial or municipal Posts &
Telecommunications Administrations ("PTAs") [reporting] directly to
the MPT., 20 Hence, the MPT still retained "a dual status as both
regulator and operator. [This] left China Unicom at a very unfavorable
position ... as it was de facto competing with the regulator, i.e., theMIPT., ,2 1
This paradox lasted until 1998 when the second phase of telecom
reform was entered into by way of a new round of government reform;
the reform was launched to further separate government and business
and to reinforce industrial regulation.22  In one such action, "the
former MPT and MEI were merged into the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII)." 23 This was accompanied by both the split of China
Telecom into four service-specific companies and the entry of China
Netcom and China Railcom into the industry, thus creating a telecom
market featuring six service-specific companies. Competition was
still limited, however, "largel due to the longtime ambiguity of
government-business relations.
" Id. at4.
18Id
21 See Xia, "Head-to-Head or Hand-in-Hand," supra note 13, at 4.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
2 1 d. at5.
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In 2002, in the wake of China's entry into WTO, the MII
undertook its most ambitious maneuver in further breaking up China
Telecom into two companies, i.e., the "South" and the "North." The
South company was branded China Telecom, and the North company
was branded China Netcom. 26  The former China Netcom was
integrated as one of the new China Netcom's subsidiaries, marking the
thirdphase of the telecom reform.27 Competition now is supposed to
take place not only among long-distance carriers but also among local
operators and across services. At the present moment, the deployment
of third generation mobile ("3G") and full-service operations is
believed by the Chinese government to be a source of corporate
competence for the telecom industry, and a new round of market
restructuring is allegedly in the pipeline.28
Over the last decade, structural reform in China's telecom industry
has been followed by profound changes in market environment,
corporate governance and the competitive behavior of firms, as well as
industry performance. After a series of divestitures, breakups, and
consolidations beginning in 1994, the Chinese telecom industry has
emerged from regulated monopoly into regulated oligopoly featuring
six players. 29 All of these players are defined as "gigantic state-owned
enterprises" ("GSOEs") that are under direct supervision of the
national State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission ("SASAC").30 All six carriers are government-dominated
26 Id.; State Council of China, The Planning on Telecommunications'System Reform, State
Council Order No. 36, Dec. 11, 2002.
27 See Xia & Lu, "Universal Service Policy in China," supra note 14; see also Zhou,
Reflections on China's Telecom Reform, supra note 14.
28 See, e.g., Ligang Xiang, A Cold Reflection on Telecom Restructuring, Communications
World (Tong Xin Shi Jie), Nov. 31, 2005.
29 The six carriers (or "Corns") include three wireline license holders (China Telecom, China
Netcom, and China Railcom), two wireless operators (China Mobile and China Unicorn), and
one satellite carrier (China Satcom). This does not include the Radio, Film and Television
("RFr') network. See, e.g., Xia, "Head-to-Head or Hand-in-Hand," supra note 13, at 5.
30 According to the Chinese government, the national State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) assumes several regulatory
functions. First, it performs the responsibility of the investor as it guides and pushes forward
the reform and restructuring of state-owned enterprises; supervises the preservation and
incrementing of the value of state-owned assets for enterprises under its supervision, and
enhances the management of state-owned assets; advances the establishment of modern
enterprise system in SOEs and perfects corporate governance; and propels the strategic
adjustment of the structure and layout of the state economy. Second, it dispatches supervisory
panels to some large enterprises on behalf of the state and takes charge of daily management
[Vol. 3:1
with state majority ownership. 31 Consequently, business conduct has
changed, sometimes leading to weakened competition. Telecom
operators remain subject to substantial intervention when making
business decisions in many areas, including pricing.
32
Although structural reform has been followed by quickened
network deployment and enhanced service availability, this rapid
expansion and technological adoption might be attributable to some
other forces as well. Such forces may include government-sponsored
investment as well as management's intentions both to expand its
power of control (by extending network coverage) and to bolster its
job-approval ratings. Firms can sometimes go so far as to pay less
attention to the call of the industrial regulator (i.e., MII) while paying
more heed to the state-asset administrator (i.e., SASAC). Part of the
evidence can be found by looking at the firms' response to the VAP
program (i.e., "Village Access Project," for detailed discussion, see
part 11 (A)) run by the MI. The tasks of village connection distributed
to the carriers to ensure 95% village penetration were supposed to be
finished by the end of 2005; however, they were actually achieved
only after strenuous coordinative efforts from the MII itself.
3
of the supervisory panels. Third, it appoints and removes top executives of enterprises, and
evaluates their performances through legal procedures while either granting rewards or
inflicting punishments based on their performances; establishes corporate executives selection
system in accordance with the requirements of socialist market economy system and modem
enterprise system; and perfects an incentives and restraints system for corporate management.
Fourth, it supervises and administers the preservation and incrementing of the value of state-
owned assets under the supervision of SASAC through statistics and auditing; establishes and
perfects the index system of the preservation and increment of the value of state-owned assets
and works out assessment criteria; and safeguards the rights and interests of the investor of
state-owned assets. Fifth and last, it drafts laws, administrative regulations of the management
of the state-owned assets, and draws up related rules; and directs and supervises the
management work of local state-owned assets according to the law. See, e.g., State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, People's Republic
of China, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/(in Chinese) and
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/engindex.htm (accessed Jan. 7, 2007).
31 See companies' websites for information about holding structures.
32 See, e.g., Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, On Further Reinforcement in
Regulating Telecom Tariffs (jointly issued by MII and National Development and Reform
Commission), No. 204 (2004).
33 Ministerial officials had to personally lobby around the country to emphasize the
significance of the Project and leverage all possible resources to fulfill the goal of ensuring
95% administrative-village-penetration by the end of 2005. See, e.g., Guohua Xi, "Speech at
the Sichuan National Special Work-Meeting on the Village Ac,cess Project" (speech, Special
Meeting on VAP, Si Chuan, 2005), http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/1 1/art_991_490.html
(in Chinese).
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Genuine competition cannot develop alone within a single sector
without the establishment of a general market system. This is
particularly true when telecom companies are assuming confused roles
as rivals, partners, and siblings, leading to even more confused market
behavior. The evolution of meaningful competition in this sector is
still a long way out. This situation more or less explains how the
processes of policy-making and the implementation of universal
service obligations (USOs) have evolved. Both the considerations of
competition in, and state dominance of, the sector would play
important roles, which in a sense prescribes the formula of what seems
to be the pragmatic USO regulatory regime in China. It is therefore
reasonable to predict that the emerging universal service regulatory
regime in China would be a hybrid of general market principles with
China's unique circumstances.
The impact of the regulatory transition for universal service should
not be underestimated. Before 1994, Chinese telephony sector was
first monopolized by the DGT, and then by China Telecom.34 With a
mandate from the central government, DGT and China Telecom were
providing universal services through internal cross-subsidization. In a
competitive market, however, the provisioning of universal service is
prone to market failure as businesses seek to maximize return on
investment. A thorough reexamination of the universal service regime
is therefore needed.
C. UNIVERSAL SERVICE TELEPHONY SERVICE: A CENTURY OF
COMMITMENT
As of June 2006, the national number of telephony subscribers was
791 million, of which 365 million were landline users35 and the
remaining 426 million were cellular subscribers. The national average
fixed- and mobile-phone penetration was 28% and 32.7%,
respectively.36 While the telecom industry has witnessed exponential
growth over the last two decades, digital divides have broadened
34 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), China Communications Yearbook 2004 (Beijing
2005).
35 The figure of"wireline" users here is inclusive of wireless users subscribed with the "Little
Smart" (or "XiaoLingTong") network that is classified by MU as "wireline" for regulatory
discretion.
36 Ministry of Information Industries (MII),
http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2006/07/24/art 27 19868.html (in Chinese, accessed Jan. 7. 2007).
The penetration data used here is that of the previous year.
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among various groups, particularly between urban and rural areas.
This breadth becomes a "Fourth Gap" in addition to the conventional
"Three Gaps." 37  In general, the average level of household income
and per-hundred-inhabitant-telephone-penetration in urban areas
compared to those in rural areas is roughly three to one.38 Disparity
exists not only between rural and urban sectors, but also amongst
different regions. Table 1 displays the differences between the
Eastern, Central, and Western regions in terms of telephone
penetration.
Table 1: Telephone Penetration: A Cross Regional Comparison
in Per-Hundred-Inhabitants as of June 2006)
39
Wireline Urban Rural Wireless
telephone wireline wireline telephone
penetration penetration telephone penetration
(2005 penetration
statistics)
National 28.0 40.3 21.7 32.7
average
Eastern 40.8 45.3 30.6 50.2
region
Central 22.9 32.2 19.1 24.9
region
Western 20.1 40.7 15.3 23.9
region
37 The "Three Gaps" used to be used as a general abbreviation of the gaps between the urban
areas and rural areas, industrial workers and agricultural farmers, and intellectuals and
physical laborers. See, e.g., Yi Li, "Chinese Social Stratification and the Cadre System: 1959-
1979," chap. 4 in The Structure and Evolution of Chinese Social Stratification (Landham, MD:
University Press of America, 2005).
38 Ministry of Information Industry, supra note 36; National Bureau of Statistics of China,
"China Statistical Yearbook 2005," supra note 3.
39 Eastern region includes provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan; central region includes provinces of
Hebei, Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; western region
includes provinces of Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan,
Tibet, Shan'xi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. See, e.g., Ministry of Information
Industry, supra note 36.
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Roughly half a century ago, the CPC created a blueprint for its
people, promising them a life of "upstairs and downstairs, electric
lights and telephony 40 in the near future. While this blueprint has
been realized to a certain extent in the city households, rural areas
have remained poor in terms of the availability of telecom services.
Thus, providing rural communication is emerging as a serious
challenge to the Chinese government in its effort to bring the sector
and the economy to a new level of reform. This disparity, however, is
not necessarily incompatible with the goal of a harmonious society and
the Party's recent ideology of building "Socialist New Villages,"
which includes addressing properly the "Three Agrarian Issues.'Al
The developmental impact of telecommunications on rural areas
has been widely reported.42 While the political and economical
rationales for providing universal service can vary across nations, the
mission faced by China's government has a unique historical context.
The success of the CPC's revolution that took place half a century ago
is attributed to the compassionate participation of farmers wishing to
acquire an equitable social status and improving their living condition.
The gaps between the urban and the rural areas, particularly those in
the "old, ethnic, remote, and deprived" areas, have become spotlights
gradually drawing intensive public attention.4 3  The existence of the
40 "Upstairs and downstairs; electric lights and telephones" has been a buzzword for about half
a century in ordinary Chinese, particularly among people in rural areas. It used to be a vivid
description of what a happy life has to offer, although nowadays what people pursue in China
is quite beyond that. See, e.g., Xia & Lu, "Universal Service Policy in China," supra note 14.
41 Refers to the developmental issues concerning "Agriculture, Villages, and Farmers," all of
which start with a "Nong" in Chinese pronunciation. See CPC Central Committee and State
Council, "Suggestions on Various Issues Regarding the Promotion of Farmers's Income
Growth," People's Daily (February 9, 2004),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/2325995.html (in Chinese).
42 Heather E. Hudson, When Telephones Reach the Village: The Role of Telecommunications
in Rural Development (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1984); Heather E. Hudson,
"From African Village to Global Village: Lessons in Bridging the African Digital Divide"
(Paper presented at the 28th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, September 23-
25, 2000), http://www.tprc.org/abstracts00/africanvillage.pdf.
43 The first word "old" refers to the areas that hosted the CPC's revolution in its early stage,
especially before the second civil war with Kuomintang; "ethnic" refers to the areas of ethnic
minority that are usually located in relatively underdeveloped regions; "remote" refers to the
areas distant from major cities; "deprived" refers to the areas that are extremely
underdeveloped and poor. See, e.g., Hequan Wu, "Constructing A Harmonious Society,
Recognizing the Fundamental Significance of Rural Communications," China Information
Times (Zhong Guo Xin Xi ie), No. 17 (September 17, 2005),
http://www.cttl.cn/zcfg/zcyj/t20060210_113664.htm (in Chinese).
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gaps is supposed to impair social harmony as well as long-run
development in China. Therefore, the new generation of CPC's
leadership has promulgated the "Three Represents '"4 as the guiding
party doctrine and put the "Three Agrarian Issues" at the top of the
party agenda, along with the previously mentioned concept of building
"Socialist New Villages."
The barriers for rural connection can be substantial in China. The
rural villages that are still unconnected are mostly located in remote
areas with complex physical geography, extreme weather, and low
population density. This can translate into high costs for network
construction and maintenance. Moreover, it is not easy to connect
these areas through the extension of existing networks. Hence, the
cost can sometimes go as high as USD 122,000 for connecting only
one telephone line under currently available technologies. 45 Thus far,
not a single so-called rural technology has been able to demonstrate
superiority in both technological and economical terms for use in rural
China. Current wireline technologies such as cable are high in cost for
rural areas, and even technologically infeasible in some areas.
Wireless technologies such as Global Standard for Mobile ("GSM"),
Code Division Multiplexing Address ("CDMA"), and Very Small
Aperture Terminal ("VSAT") are also expensive. Satellite technology
seems to be a better alternative for areas with extremely low
population density. However, there are demonstrable constraints in
practice due to technological immaturity and limited transmitting
capacity. In addition, the condition of parallel infrastructures such as
power, road, and water are usually poor in rural areas, driving the
maintenance costs even higher. On the demand side, farmers in many
rural areas are still not accustomed to reaching out through
44 Refers to the visionary objectives of the party to "represent the development requirement of
advanced productive forces, the most advanced cultural trend, and the fundamental interest of
the people." The "Three Represents" doctrine has been compulsorily integrated into curricula
of secondary and higher education nationwide. See Jinag Zemin, Speech at the Celebration of
the 80th Anniversary of the CPC, Beijing, July 1, 2001, http://www.cctv.com/special/733/-
1/47001.html (in Chinese); and People's Daily, Comment (Let the Important Thought of
'Three Represents' Enter Textbook, Classroom, and Student's Brain and Become
Contemporary Young Students' Guideline and Spiritual Power Engine)," People's Daily (Ren
Min Ri Bao) (November 26, 2003),
http://www.people.com.cnGB/paper464/10731/975353.html (in Chinese).
41 Jinliang Li, "Wireless Access is the Optimal Technological Solution for
Telecommunications Universal Service," People 's Posts & Telecommunications (Ren Min You
Dian), April 25, 2003, http://www.cnii.com.cn/20030526/cal57905.htm (in Chinese).
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telecommunications. 4 6  Evidence shows telephones installed in rural
households are largely used for receiving calls from family members
working in urban centers.47  As a result, the average number of
inbound calls is roughly three times as large as that of outbound-calls
in those areas.
48
Before 1998, rural communication had witnessed a period of rapid
growth, particularly from 1995 through 1997. This growth was
supported by the internal cross-subsidization mechanism of the former
wireline monopolist-the previous China Telecom.49 The introduction
of competition and removal of the initial access charge as a direct
result of government reform in 1998, however, have led to the end of
cross-subsidization. The result is that the former China Telecom
slowed down the pace in investment in rural networks. Annual growth
of rural connections in terms of village telephone penetration
plummeted from 10% before 1999 to 2% afterward.50 The former
China Telecom was allegedly frustrated by tremendous business losses
incurred in providing telephone services to rural areas. The total
amount of loss in five relatively developed provinces (Guangdong,
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shandong) rose from USD 1793
million in previous years to USD 2244 million in 2001.51
In 2000, the Telecommunications Regulations52 was issued by the
central government.53 Although the USOs on carriers are stipulated in
Article 44 of Chapter 2 of the Regulations, it does not specify the
46 See, e.g., Ministry of Information Industry, China Communications Yearbook 2004, supra
note 34.
47 Id.
48id.
49 id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 The Chinese government is now considering formulating its first-ever Telecommunications
Act. An advisory board of 26 expert members has been formed to provide advisory support to
the MII (the de facto act writer). See, e.g., XinHua Net, "Draft Telecom Act Comes out with
Four Focuses to Be Addressed," News.cn, March 3, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2004-
03/03/content_1342343.htm (in Chinese, accessed Nov. 13, 2006).
" State Council, Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Order
No. 291, September 25, 2000, http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/telecom/2000-09-30/38217.shtml (in
Chinese).
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objectives or even support mechanisms and governance. Therefore, a
"regulatory vacuum" regarding universal service has emerged. As a
result, no carriers care to provide rural services. Some remote areas
that were originally connected even reverted to disconnection when
losses piled up. An explicit universal service regime remained elusive.
II. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT REGIME
A. KICK-OFF OF THE VILLAGE ACCESS PROJECT
To address the pressing issue of rural communications, the MI
launched the "Village Access Project" ("VAP") in 2004.54 As a result,
40,000 administrative villages nationwide were connected by the end
of 2005. The result was a rise in the per-hundred-administrative-
village telephone penetration from 89% before the Project to more
than 97% after the Project.55 Now the CPC is mobilizing the country
to launch its I Ith Five-Year-Plan ("FYP"), part of which includes
elevating the national village telephone penetration rate to 100%.56
The 11 th FYP is intended to mark the beginning of the transition from
the concept of community access to a new level of universal service.
This new level includes the adoption of the concept of household-
based-penetration in relatively developed areas as well as the pursuit
of national informization goals.57  Echoing the CPC's Central
Committee and the State Council on "The Promotion of the
Establishment of Socialist New Villages" 58 for the 11 th FYP, in early
2006 MII promulgated the "Suggestions on the Promotion of the
54 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, Rural Communications Universal Service-
A Guideline to the Implementation of the RuralAccess Project, Jan. 16, 2004,
http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/29/art_992_4083.html (in Chinese).
55 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Briefing on the VAP, Concluding Meeting of 2005
on the VAP was Held in Yan 'an, Shan 'xi, Briefings No.7 (2005),
http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2006/01/06/art_990_4764.html (in Chinese).
56 98.6% and 100% by the end of 2006 and 2007, respectively.
57 Ministry of Information Industries (MII), The MIII Sets Forth New Goal for the VAP in
2006, http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2006/02/23/art_990_7047.html (in Chinese, accessed July 1,
2006).
58 CPC Central Committee & State Council, "Suggestions on the Promotion of the
Establishment of Socialist New Villages" (official document, the 5th Session of the CPC's
16th Congregation, 5th sess., 2005), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/21/content_205958.htm
(in Chinese).
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Establishment of Socialist New Villages"5 9  (hereinafter
"Suggestions"). The "Suggestions" marks a new level of effort to
address the "Three Agrarian Issues." The "Suggestions" loosely
outline the significance, guiding principles, objectives,
implementation, and administrative measures of the ICT sector's
participation in the nationwide "Socialist New Villages" drive.
In the absence of an explicit universal service regime, the VAP has
been serving as a useful platform since its inauguration for
implementing USOs in China. Following the Chinese government's
longtime philosophy of "trial before action," the VAP was initially
launched in January 2004 on a trial basis in five provinces (Shan'xi,
Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Guangxi, and Henan). It was expanded later
in the middle of 2004 to enlist another eight provinces (Gansu, Jiangsi,
Hebei, Hunan, Guizhou, Qinhai, Xinjiang, and Ningxia). After two
phases of trial implementation, the VAP was officially launched on a
full scale in early 2005. According to the State Council and MII, a
new plan is now in the pipeline to move on to the next stage of
universal service efforts that will integrate Internet deployment in rural
areas into its objectives. 60
While administration of the VAP is primarily the MII's
responsibility, participation from local government is also expected.
There is a division of responsibilities between the MII and provincial
communications bureaus ("PCBs") in this regard. Under the direct
supervision of a deputy minister of the MII, the Department of
Telecommunications Regulation ("DTR") of the M11 acts as the
specific acting body. The PCBs take charge of daily supervision and
evaluation of developments in the VAP programs, within their
jurisdictions, as well as leveraging other local government agencies for
assistance in terms of capital investment and supportive taxation
policy.
61
Technologically, carriers are encouraged to first consider the
expansion of their existing networks. If proven indispensable, the
application of wireless technologies, including satellite, will also be
59 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, Suggestions on the Promotion of the
Establishment of Socialist New Villages, No. 229 (2006),
http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2006/04/14/art541_10682.html (in Chinese).
60 Ministry of Information Industry (M11), The Ml Sets Forth New Goal for the VAP in 2006,
supra note 57.
61 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, On the Full Rollout of the Village Access
Project in the Year of2005, No. 55 (2005),
http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/29/art_992_4081_2.html (in Chinese).
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permitted by the MII. 62 Where wireless technologies are proven to be
necessary, the MI would encourage the use of those with domestic
proprietary intellectual property. SCDMA 400MHz, for example,
commercially launched in the middle of 2004, fits the domestic profile
and has been delivered by MI on many occasions. 63 The MI also
provides privileges to those carriers who are, or will be, supplying
services to rural areas for the use of radio spectrum unless the same
spectrum is applied to a more important entity.64 CDMA 450MHz, for
example, has been allotted for military and public security applications
and is therefore prohibited from civil applications by the carriers. 65 To
ensure affordability of telephone services to already connected areas,
the MI exercises a price cap regulation on the pricing of rural
services. Tariffs on rural services should not be higher than the
carriers' existing tariff schemes. 66  Carriers are supposed to secure
interconnection of the VAP programs with existing networks. These
carriers are prohibited by rule from dismantling or disconnecting rural
telephones for any excuse, including unpaid tariffs.
B. PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES
Although it is generally unrealistic to expect China to adopt the
kind of policy solution that would be characteristically imbedded in a
market economy, there still exists some room for possible
improvement in the present regime. As an interim arrangement, the
VAP serves the government's short-term objective well, however,
problems remain. In addition to the absence of a long-run objective
and an explicit support mechanism, the present regime has
demonstrated a number of other drawbacks or deficiencies in terms of
its unsustainability, inconsistency, fragmented governance, and
unattended agency problems; all of these drawbacks have been
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Xi, Speech, supra note 33; Jinsheng Su, "Speech at the National Special Work-
Conference on the village Access Project" (speech, Special Meeting on VAP, Sichuan, China,
2005), http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/29/art 991 4080.html (in Chinese).
64 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, On the Full Rollout of the Village Access
Project, supra note 61; Xi, Speech, supra note 33.
65 See, e.g., Xi, Speech,, supra note 33; Su, Speech, supra note 63.
66 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, Rural Communications Universal Service,
supra note 54.
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compromising the execution of the Project itself. For example,
without funding, major carriers are used to choosing a wait-and-see
strategy toward their assigned tasks. This strategy was applied until
substantial bureaucratic interventions began around the middle of
2005, a time when the deadline was closely approaching.
The VAP was devised and launched in the absence of an expressly
defined universal service regulatory regime. Due to the possibility of
both incentive incompatibility and ineffective governance, there is no
sustainable guarantee for the objectives of universal service. In some
areas where connections have been made, there is a tendency to fall
back to disconnection because of alleged business loss. Meanwhile,
the current method of assigning VAP tasks through the conventional
governmental command chain is most likely causing hidden problems
for the future implementation of USOs in China. For one thing, the
approach currently used in task distribution may be creating rigidity
instead of flexibility in the patterns of USO award mechanisms. Such
rigidity would be detrimental to the possible competitive supply of
universal service in the future. In addition, the government's role is
not clearly defined, and the carriers' obligations are not strictly
binding.
Central-local relations in terms of infrastructure investment in
China have long been subtle. 67  Although participation from
governments and carriers at both central and local levels are expected
for the VAP, an effective institutional approach for coordination
remains nonexistent. As divisions of provincial governments, PCBs
report directly to MI. Much of the local assistance, such as the
supportive taxation policy and the use of land and power, however, is
supposed to be from other divisions of the local governments beyond
the PCBs' reach. Meanwhile, the division of responsibilities between
the central offices of the carriers and their provincial subsidiaries, with
regard to USOs, are ambiguous. The VAP tasks were assigned to the
central offices and, in turn, further distributed by the central offices to
their provincial branches, based not on measurable variables such as
revenues but mostly on geographical adjacency.68  Therefore,
disproportionate burdens arise among the branches of the GSOEs,
which "has been one of the practical reasons for delay." 69 The central-
67 See also Jun Ma, "Modeling Central-Local Fiscal Relations in China," China Economic
Review 6 (1995): 105-136; Weiying Zhang, "Game Theory and Economics of Information"
(in Chinese), at 90-97, Shanghai People's Press (1996).
68See also Xia & Lu, "Universal Service Policy in China," supra note 14, at 9.
69 1d. at 10-11.
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local conflicts are further fueled by the absence of an explicit support
mechanism, for which the government cannot even provide a
timetable. The enforcement of the VAP received resistance at the very
beginning from carriers whose branches avowed a funding
deficiency.
70
Without incentive compatibility and participation constraints,
opportunistic behaviors such as suspension occurred among most
carriers in the early stage of the VAP. For those provincial telecom
branches who had been assigned the VAP tasks, one paradox faced by
them was that the less developed the areas in which they were located,
the more burdens they were forced to bear. This is because the VAP
tasks are located mostly in relatively deprived areas but the
distribution mechanism is based on geographical adjacency. Without
funding in sight, the optimal strategy for these branches is simply to
wait.71  Meanwhile, even though the MII is the primary agency
responsible for the fulfillment of the administrative village-penetration
goal, cooperation and assistance are also expected from other central
government departments. However, due to pervasive, unattended
agency problems within China's bureaucratic government, the
attention has not been adequate.
Government-business relations in China have long been
ambiguous. This ambiguity is unlikely to dissipate with the rollout of
the VAP. The current institutional arrangement toward USOs lacks
long-run sustainability in the course of market reform. Neither is the
regime compatible with competition. This can lead to a number of
hidden problems for emerging policy, particularly when there has
existed a legacy of complicated interpersonal relations between
regulatory officials and industry executives. In the meantime, the
current six carriers are overnment dominated firms where ownership
is highly concentrated. For this reason, among others, a business
culture featuring entrepreneurship and professionalism remains elusive
in this conventionally government-run industry. In addition to
network externalities, unattended agency problems within SOEs can
sometimes make necessary cooperation between carriers difficult to
happen, even if it accords with the interests of all sides involved and
society in general. The ownership system in China is not only
70 1d. at 11.
71 The wait-and-see strategy adopted by provincial telecom branches can also be attributed to
tacit collusion between the branches and their respective central offices.
72 See companies' annual reports.
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impeding the future progress of market reform in the long-term, but it
is also impairing the market-oriented execution of current rural access
programs in the short-run.
While the difficulties described above only scratch the surface of
the deficiencies underlying the present regime from a technical point
of view, the fundamental causes are arguably rooted in the political
foundation, and consequently, the legal and economic system. The
VAP is implemented in the absence of general competition policy and
sector-specific regulatory law. Hence, given China's unique
condition, it is reasonable to forecast that there is a need for an
integrated, rather than hodgepodge, approach in considering an
emerging universal service regime.
III. THE IDEAL REGULATORY REGIME: SUSTAINABILITY AND
CONSISTENCY
Support mechanisms and regulatory governance are two major
issues in designing a universal service regime in China. Within these
issues, sustainability and consistency are the two crucial hurdles to
overcome. However, before addressing these, a systematic look must
be taken at such things as the formula in designing USO programs,
service definition, service targeting, and so on. In so doing, both the
experiences of western countries and unique domestic conditions must
be taken into account.
A. A FORMULA IN DESIGNING USO PROGRAMS
Access to telecommunications services increasingly sets the
threshold for citizen participation in the democratic process and
economic marketplace, as well as other social and cultural activities
that enrich the quality of life. In one way or another, the need for the
universality of telecom services derives from a person's ideal of equal
access to the communication means that modem society has to offer.
Universal service obligations form an integral part of a national
telecommunications policy that has direct impacts on the market,
technology, and investments. The pursuit of USOs thus comes from
the goal of equity. This goal means promoting social parity in terms of
equal access to telecom services. In recent years, universal service has
also been believed to be efficiency-compatible in terms of positive
network externalities and spill-over effects of telecom consumption.
73
71 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact,"
Japan and the World Economy (paper presented at the Annual Telecommunications Policy
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On the one hand, the welfare nature of USOs defines itself as a quasi-
public good that cannot be efficiently supplied if left alone to market
forces. On the other hand, the externalities and spill-overs effect can
lead to inefficient supply of the services. This makes it the
government's responsibility to adequately supply services through
implementing a USO policy that can help ensure both availability and
affordability of telecom services to a greater fraction of a population in
a cost-effective fashion.
The deployment of telecommunications can stimulate, as well as
be an indicator of, development. The construction of
telecommunications networks in rural China has contributed
remarkably to economic growth and social development. This justifies
the argument that the diffusion of telecommunications is not only a
mere trade-off between equity and efficiency, but also complementary
to the two goals. In China, public attention to, and debate on,
universal service issues is a recent event.74 While consensus has been
achieved on the necessity to provide universal service under a
deregulated market, arguments are mainly focused on issues about the
objectives, support mechanisms, and regulatory governance. To
facilitate the policy goal, certain scientific decision-making processes
need to be followed by China when formulating its USO programs.
These processes may include the following steps:
Defining Objectives: What is the objective of USOs
in China? What are the rationales for the objective
and does it fit the overall socio-economic
development as well as national informization goals?
Conference, Tokyo, Japan), http://www.stem.nyu.edu/networks/telco96.html (accessed Dec.
29, 2006).
74 See, e.g., Xiang Cai, Costing of Universal Service and Its Implementation Under
Competition (in Chinese), report of Soft-Science Research Program Sponsored by the Ministry
of Information Industry of China (1998), as referred to in Xia & Lu, "Universal Service Policy
in China," supra note 14; Jun Xia, "Telecommunications Universal Service Policy: China vs
Western Countries" (in Chinese), 14(4) World Telecommunications (Shi Jie Dian Xin)
(Beijing: 2001), 3-9, as referred to in Xia & Lu, "Universal Service Policy in China," supra
note 14.
75 Based on Dr. Patrick Xavier, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications Environment
(Paris: OECD, 1995).
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* Identifying Barriers: What are possible barriers to
the defmed objective of USOs? Apart from
technological, economical, natural, and socio-
cultural factors, are there any other factors that need
attention?
* Developing Alternative Solutions: What are possible
solutions to the barriers? What alternative universal
service programs are possible? How will the current
telecom regulatory regime affect the design of USO
programs in China?
* Evaluating and Deciding: Which USO programs are
the most cost-effective and practicable in China?
Would they address the urgent needs in the short-run
as well as the need to be competitively neutral in the
long-run? What criteria should be considered in
evaluating alternative USO programs?
* Implementing and Controlling: What is the most
affective way to implement USO programs? Do the
current regulatory governance system and the
government's role have to be reevaluated? What are
the implications do technological change and
globalization have on the future universal service
regime in China?
B. DEFINING BASIC SERVICES
Although countries may differ from one another in the specific
objectives of their USOs, one common mission faced by all is to
properly define the scope of universal services. Too broad of a scope
may lead to much distortion while too narrow a scope cannot ensure
the goal of maximum equity (and efficiency). For most of the 20th
century, universal service meant voice grade access to the Public
Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN"), including access to
emergency and operator services, and directory assistance.76
However, the emergence of advanced technologies and technological
76 See, e.g., Colin R. Blackman, "Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?,"
Telecommunications Policy, no. 3 (1995): 171.
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convergence in the end of last century has led to worldwide rethinking
of universal service policy. The newly rethought policy would include
most recent services, such as broadband and internet access. In
defining the scope of basic services, the two major considerations are
the status of socio-economic development and the national
informization strategy.
Telecommunications have become so crucial to a nation's
economic development, as well as its citizens' cultural inclusion, that
every member and household of a society is entitled to share its
benefits. However, due to such barriers as accessibility, affordability,
and profitability, most rural communities are extremely underserved,
particularly those in relatively less developed regions in China. For
those individuals and households who currently have no access to any
kind of telecom services, even the provisioning of standard telephony
would bring meaningful change to their lives. When defining the
scope of services, value judgment, which can vary from country to
country, plays an inevitable role. Given the current circumstances
surrounding China, this definition of scope needs to meet the two
following basic criteria:
78
Technologically, services that come under USOs do
not have to be the most advanced ones; instead, the
scope should demonstrate a basic level of service
that also responds to regional differences and
uniqueness. The concept of universal service is
evolving over time, resulting in different generations
of universal service policy.79 Although in principle,
these services should be mature and currently used
by the majority of people, it does not rule out the
possibility of including "advanced service" such as
Internet access. Such advanced services can also
become "basic" and "mature" over time. Decisions
on this matter rely heavily on a cost-benefit analysis,
and the definition of scope of services is contingent
77 See also Xi, Speech, supra note 33.
78 See also Xia, "Telecommunication Universal Service Policy," supra note 74.
79 See, e.g., Claire Milne, "Stages of Universal Service Policy," Telecommunications Policy 22
(1998): 775-780; Milton Mueller, "Universal Service and the New Telecommunications Act:
Mythology Made Law," Communications of the ACM40 (1997): 39-47.
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upon the status of technological advancement and
general economic development.
Economically, the scope of services should be
limited only to those services where market forces
fail, when firms as profit-maximizers do not
voluntarily opt to supply the services. When the
services can be effectively supplied through the
market, they should not be included in USO
programs. In other words, the purpose of USO
programs is to provide services to those groups who
are underserved or un-serve under a deregulated
telecommunications market where the provisioning
of these services is justified in terms of both equity
and efficiency considerations.
In spite of the laggard rural telephone access witnessed in China, it
is still encouraging to see that radio and television have been made
available to most rural areas, thanks largely to the CPC's ideological
propaganda initiatives which leveraged decades-long joint efforts of
the government, and sometimes, military units to extend radio and
television coverage to "every corner" of China. Concurrently, the
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television ("SARFT") is also
running a "Village Access Project" that focuses on expanding radio
and television coverage to rural villages.80  This is done largely
through satellite technology, though the available channels are still
limited in some areas due to constraints in transmission capacity.
Compared with radio and television, however, the diffusion of Internet
service in rural China lags far behind the national average. Indeed,
"despite efforts from relevant governmental agencies to call for urban
businesses and individuals to help rural primary and middle schools Zo
online," contributions to this sympathy project are far from adequate. "s l
Such inadequacy makes the provisioning of Internet service to rural
areas another tough issue if Internet access is to be included in the
universal service scope.
10 See relevant materials under the same title "Village Access Project" at the official web site
of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) of China,
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/downstage/pagel61.jsp (accessed Nov. 20, 2006).
S See also Xia & Lu, "Universal Service Policy in China," supra note 14, at 14.
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C. TARGETING THE RURAL COMMUNITY
As mentioned above, while digital divides in China can also be
identified based on other variables, rural communications have
become the primary focus of the universal service effort.82 The degree
of severity in the deprivation of telecommunications service from rural
areas ascends from eastern, central, to western regions (see Table 1).
Thus, priorities need to be placed accordingly. To summarize, the
rationale for emphasis on rural access in China is multifold:
Politically, the CPC put forward in the Sixteenth
Congress the goal of establishing an equitable and
harmonious society with a comfortable standard of
living. The "Three Agrarian Issues" is supposed to
be a focal point, a goal which has recently been
expanded to a larger concept of building "Socialist
New Villages." To achieve this goal, the
improvement of rural communications, among other
things, was intended as a sign of the Party's drive to
address these issues.83
* Economically, the growth of the agricultural industry
is far behind other sectors in China largely due to
insufficient technological innovation as well as
inadequate infrastructure. This has become a major
impediment to overall economic growth." Rural
economic growth responds heavily to infrastructure
investments including telecommunications that have
been regarded as an important engine for rural
growth and development.
82 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, Rural Communications Universal Service,
supra note 54.
83 Id.
84 During the 10th FYP, GDP growth per annum averaged about 9.5% while the same
indicator for the agricultural sector is below 5%. According to the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, value-added from primary industry (agriculture) in 2005 only accounts for
12.4% of the total economy, while the secondary and tertiary sectors accounts for 47.3% and
40.3%, respectively. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, "China Statistical Yearbook
2005," supra note 3.
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Additionally, the development of urban and rural
areas is interdependent, as a harmonious society and
healthy economy can only be achieved through
simultaneous development in both urban and rural
communities.
In this context, the basic goal for China in its USO policy at its
current stage is to ensure universal access to every rural community,
which would mean accessibility of basic services to every
"administrative" village rather than every "natural" village. The
warranty for the concept of community access rather than per-
hundred-inhabitant penetration at this point is reasonable when
technology and market demand is considered, though political and
ideological forces are now inclined to go even further to advocate a
new round of large scale crusades to eventually deploy most ICT
services to every comer of rural China.85 According to estimates,
about USD20 billion of infrastructure investment (assuming wireline
technology is applied) is required to increase national rural per-
hundred-household-penetration by only an extra two percentage
points. This amount would skyrocket to USD2400 billion if access to
every household was desired, even without considering time
constraint.86 Meanwhile, businesses are concerned with a return on
investment ROI) that is supposedly extremely modest or negative in
rural areas. It is therefore conceivable that local loops are also
bottlenecks of universal service for rural regions. Consequently, there
is a lack of both economic feasibility and political urgency for the
government to take on household penetration as a current objective. In
this sense, the objective (but not necessarily the regulatory regime) of
the VAP has been pragmatic from the very beginning.
Emphasis on the concept of community access does not necessarily
mean to overshadow the significance of nationwide informization
objectives. The goal of community access can serve as a preliminary
foundation, based on which more ambitious universal service efforts
may be initiated. The concept of community access in China should
85 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), The M Sets Forth New Goal for the VAP in 2006,
supra note 57.
86 See also Li, "Wireless Access is the Optimal Technological Solution," supra note 45.
87 Ministry of Information Industry (M11), China Communications Yearbook 2004, supra note
34.
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last for a long time in the foreseeable future; 88 this means that the
definition of universality would be a community-based concept,
whether it be through the servicing of plain-old telephone or Internet
applications currently defined as advances services. In its 11 th FYP,
China's government set forth the objective of telephone access to
every village of no less than fifty households and Internet access to
every township. 89 This objective is both pragmatic and feasible based
on current conditions as well as possible future changes in the market
and future economic development. Putting aside possible future
political dynamics, individual access to either telephone or Internet
service in the near future (ten years or even beyond) in China should
not be covered under regular USO programs, particularly if account is
taken of the stage of general market development.
As far as community access is concerned, some practical issues
may arise when it comes to specific locations where the recipients
(village members) have difficulties accessing services. This concern is
further highlighted by the fact that a number of unconnected villages
are located in areas with extreme natural conditions and low
population density.90 According to the ITU universal access can be
defined as telephone availability within twenty kilometers, or within a
traveling distance of thirty minutes or a telephone in every locality of
more than five hundred people. 9f In the case of China, for the
convenience of administration and maintainability, telephone terminals
can be installed at venues where village governments and/or village
schools are located.92
The adoption of the community access concept does not mean that
regional differences should be neglected. Conversely, the definition of
universality should respond to regional differences, primarily in terms
of income. Therefore, in most western and central regions, the recent
88 Based on the author's prediction, the community concept will last for at least 10 years,
beginning from 2006.
89 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), The MI Sets Forth New Goal for the VAP in 2006,
supra note 57.
90 Yanpeng Du, "Rural Communications during the Course of Transition," China
Telecommunication Trade (Zhong Guo Dian Xin Ye), May, 2005,
http://www.cnii.com.cn/20050508/ca297186.htm (in Chinese).
91 International Telecommunications Union, World Telecommunications Development Report
1998-Universal Access, Geneva: ITU (1998), http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/publications/wtdr_98/index.html (accessed May 25, 2005).
92 See also Xia, "Universal Service Policy in China" supra note 14.
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goal of USOs is probably to ensure every administrative village has at
least one working telephone line.93 While this is actually the current
focus of universal service efforts, in relatively affluent areas, such as
those in eastern China, the USO goal may also include household
penetration and Internet diffusion, even though voice grade access
should still be the focus. The responsibility of the central government
should be limited to only the nationwide provisioning of a basic level
of services. Advanced services (such as Internet access) should be the
responsibility of the local government. The central government has
issued a list of poverty-stricken counties in twelve central and western
provinces that need urgent attention in poverty alleviation. 94  The
listed counties coincidentally cover most of the unconnected villages,
which the current USO programs should target.
In summary, the implementation of universal service in China in
the foreseeable future should be primarily based on the community
access concept even though, in the process, associated political
dynamics (e.g., the "Three Agrarian Issues" or "Socialist New
Villages") may lead to the advocacy of even more ambitious goals.
Based on China's condition, a two-phase concept can be identified in
defining basic services. The short-term objective is to make voice
grade access to PSTN available, either through wireline or wireless, at
a reasonable quality and rate to all communities no matter their
geographical locations, socio-economic standing, and profitability.
The long-run objective should be the promotion of household
penetration and the deployment of Internet access.
D. SUPPORTING THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE PROGRAMS: IS USF THE
FINAL RESORT?
Support mechanisms, which had been hindering the smooth
execution of the VAP in the first phase (i.e., 2004-2005), should be
reliable, whether obtained from external sources (e.g., general finance,
industry taxation) or the firm's internal subsidy (but not cross-
subsidy). Ideally, universal service programs should be financed
explicitly, funded broadly, targeted narrowly, competitively neutral,
93 Ministry of Information Industry (MII), Notice, Rural Communications Universal Service,
supra note 54.
94 The most recent version of the list has been expanded to include more provinces. See, e.g.,
State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, List of Poverty-
Stricken Counties Determined by Provinces,
http://www.cpad.org.cn/data/2006/0303/article_312.htm (accessed Nov. 23, 2006).
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provide the least distortion, and be served most efficiently.95 Other
criteria for evaluating a support mechanism may include transparency,
equity, efficiency, cost effectiveness, flexibility, incentive
compatibility, predictability, accountability, and costs of
implementation and administration. 96 In China, however, a standard
market-driven approach is destined to be configured in such a way that
the following environmental factors must be taken into account.
* First, market reform has been a trend. The telecom
industry is now undergoing a transition toward
competition where universal service is not supposed
to impede, but rather expedite, the transitional
process.
* Second, governance and the system of ownership are
characterized by state dominance that would
inevitably exert substantial influence on the
formulation of the USO regime particularly through
support mechanisms.
* Third, China now faces an obligation to honor its
WTO commitment and observe WTO rules and
practice. This means that policies should embody
the idea of consistency and neutrality in terms of
investment, technology, and competition.
* Fourth, an explicitly defined competition policy in
telecommunications is still elusive in China. The
current Telecommunications Regulations are vague
in terms of policy objectives, implementation
strategy, and governance. China also does not have
a general competition law.
* Fifth, historical legacies inherited during and after
the monopoly era also poses a constraint on the
current universal service regime. During the process
95 See also Economides, "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Its Impact," supra note
74, at 19-20.
96 OECD, Universal Service Obligations, supra note 76.
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of telecom reform, carriers committed a certain
amount of investment to building rural infrastructure
that now has to be maintained and operated under
the emerging regime.
In an era where the economy is being liberalized and the political
regime remains untouched, China should follow its own path in
considering a support mechanism. In doing so, certain criteria need to
be considered:
* First, the regime has to demonstrate continuity and
sustainability, which should accommodate the
smooth transition from the current regime toward the
emerging one, and ensure a predictable flow of
funding on a regular basis.
" Second, the regime has to demonstrate attributes of
fairness and transparency, particularly when private
and foreign participation in the sector become
realistically substantial.
* Third, the regime should be efficiency-friendly,
which means it should not cause much distortion in
terms of investment and choice of technology.
* Fourth, and last, the regime should incur low
enforcement cost, which has become one of the most
controversial issues in contemporary China.
There are normally two sources of contribution, i.e., the general
taxation system and levies on the industry. Although generalized
public sources may contribute more to the goal of equity and cause the
least distortion, some pragmatic factors seem to nullify the idea of
taking recourse to the general public for rural access in China. First,
funding of universal service is conventionally regarded as a sector-
specific issue. Hence, negative responses from other governmental
departments are expected if funds are taken from the general tax
revenue. 97 Second, China is a developing country with a myriad of
communities and individuals competing for assistance in one aspect or
97 See also Xia, "Universal Service Policy in China," supra note 14.
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another. It may not make sense to turn to general public resources to
fund a universal service. Third, since the telecom sector has long been
given priority and privileges over other industries in terms of
investment and deployment of new technologies, now would probably
be the time for the sector to return the favor to society by simply not
soliciting the general taxpayers. These factors, among others, indicate
that for the time being there is no sound rationale to solicit from the
general public. This is notwithstanding the fact that either general tax
sources or levies on the industry are de facto different forms of cross-
subsidization.
As a standard norm of universal service administration, the
universal service fund ("USF") has been taken as an ultimate solution
by the MII from the early promulgation of the Telecommunications
Regulations to the recent issuance of the "Suggestions." One sign of
this dates back to 1999 with the establishment of a center by the MII to
specifically deal with universal service costs and other policy matters.
Government agencies, telecom carriers, and academic researchers all
support creating a USF in China. Factors behind their favorable
attitudes may include the following:
" Regulators favor the expected bureaucratic
expansion that a USF will likely entail;98
* Because a USF has become a standard mechanism,
international experience is available to be learned
from and applied.
" Incumbent carriers are inclined to delay action due
to piled-up-losses whereas a USF appears to be the
most anticipatable funding opportunity in the
foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the establishment of a USF in China would involve
substantial regulatory cost due to cost allocation and duplicate
regulatory efforts. This is particularly true in the presence of
98 Government agencies at various levels have developed their own interests in China, which
sometimes make administrative reorganization one of the toughest tasks when certain interest
groups are to be harmed because of this. Harmed parties or individuals can sometimes go so
far as resorting to violence to impede the process. See, e.g., SINA, "Two Deputy Municipal
Party Secretaries in Hubei Province Who Organized Assault Against Local Party and
Executive Organizations Were Investigated and Punished," February, 25, 2006,
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-02-25/02008296002s.shtml (accessed May 29, 2006).
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information asymmetry where unattended agency problems can
sometimes lead to a high shadow price of public funds. Meanwhile,
universal service cost allocation has been proven by many countries to
be an arduous task that relies heavily on sophisticated engineering
modeling as well as collaborations from the carriers that provide cost
information. Policy-makers are therefore facing a trade-off between
regulatory convenience as a result of expanded organization and high
regulatory cost, an even tougher issue given China's current situation.
IV. AN OPTION FOR CHINA: A "NON-SUBSIDY" APPROACH
As an alternative institutional arrangement to a USF regime, a
"non-subsidy" approach without the establishment of any kind of fund
could be followed by China. This would result in the distribution of
USOs directly to incumbent carriers, based on identifiable variables
such as network coverage and revenue, but without monetary subsidy.
The rationale of this "non-subsidy" approach could include the
following:
First, not only has genuine competition remained
unestablished in this industry, but it is uncertain
when competition will eventually develop. This
seems to be a long way away for the transition of
China's economy, and the ICT sector in particular,
which is far from being market-driven. (Certainty)
* Second, since the ownership structure of the
incumbent carriers is without exception under
government-domination, "non-subsidy" policy
actually means majority subsidy from the state-
ownership part. As for institutional investors and
private shareholders, this policy is not supposed to
cause much distortion as long as the policy is
expressly defined beforehand. (Transparency,
Consistency)
" Third, incumbent carriers receive benefits in
providing rural services through positive network
and brand effect. Besides, this sector used to receive
more privileged treatment over other industries in
terms of supportive taxation policy and government
funding. (Fairness)
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Fourth, all carriers are vertically integrated firms
that operate at all layers of the industry including
access, transmission, application, and content. Even
if in the foreseeable future the ownership structure
should become more fragmented for any reason
(e.g., the introduction of more aggressive
competition policy), USOs can still be easily
identified with physical networks. This means a
transition between the new and old regimes can be
seamless, which is also the case with the VAP.
(Sustainability, Consistency)
Fifth, this policy is cost-effective. It can save a
substantial amount of money from cost allocation,
administration, and other regulatory efforts. By
comparison, however, the USF regime can be more
vulnerable to corruption or other types of
opportunistic behaviors. (Low regulatory and
agency cost)
Under "non-subsidy" policy carriers can be offered the option to
freely transfer their obligations with each other based on free industrial
negotiations. In this way, high-cost firms may choose to transfer their
obligations to firms with relatively lower costs. For the time being, a
"non-subsidy" approach can also be promulgated as a formal rule for
the ongoing VAP before any emerging regulatory regime actually
comes out. Through these means an explicit message can be sent to
the players in their decision-making so as to avoid carriers pleading
funding deficiency in order to compromise their obligations. This
arrangement can be compatible with the current industry
configuration, forthcoming industry restructuring, and the future
market-driven ICT industry. The negative side of this policy, if any,
lies in the fact that it is probably not competitively neutral when the
industry is subject to substantial competition from a new entry. If this
is really the case, an asymmetric USO regulation needs to be
considered to protect effective entry.
While a "non-subsidy" policy partially addresses the issues of
consistency and sustainability, the regime still cannot be sustainable in
the absence of effective regulatory governance. At present, regulatory
independence is often taken as a safeguard for effective regulation. In
its WTO accession protocol, China certified the Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and its Reference
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Paper. The Paper stipulates that: "[t]he regulatory body is separate
from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic
telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures
used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all market
participants." 99 Whereas the term "independence" is subject to various
interpretations, organizational autonomy and arm's length relationship
with the regulated industry, political authorities, as well as other
private interests are commonly agreed upon. Based on current
political, legal, and economic configurations in China, regulatory
independence is subject to a number of restraints, which creates the
following concerns:
* Can the enforcement of a telecom law without a
general competition policy in place really lead to
effective regulation?
* Can genuine regulatory independence possibly
surface amid the current interweaving of complex
political and interpersonal relationships?"
* Will genuine and effective competition among
operators eventually develop before any major
changes are made to corporate governance of the
firms and political governance of the state?
The allegedly forthcoming telecom law is supposedly a delicate
balance between general principles of competition policy, WTO
commitment and political goals.' 0  However, it probably will make no
difference what specific form the regulatory body will take before any
major reform takes place in the political regime. Therefore, the more
pragmatic initiative probably lies in shifting regulatory reform efforts
to focus on the enhancement and elevation of professionalism and
operational efficiency of the incumbent regulator-MI, for which
reinforcing the rule of law is of critical significance. In addition,
regulatory convergence should be arranged when the timing is mature.
With no further unexpected major regulatory governance restructuring
99 World Trade Organization, WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications (Geneva:
WTP Forum, 1998), http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press/WTPF98/WTORefpaper.html
(accessed Dec. 29, 2006).
100 See also Jun Xia, "Competition Policy in Telecommunications in the 21st Century" (in
Chinese), 18(2) World Telecommunications (2005).
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in sight, investors, consumers, and carriers (including universal service
providers) can enjoy more certainty when making business decisions.
As integral part of overall regulatory regime, USO policy itself also
requires an integrated regime. To ensure transparency and
sustainability, a number of vertical and horizontal relations need to be
explicitly re-defined; and the Chinese government needs to be clear
about its own long-run guiding objectives of universal service. Since
no ready model can be borrowed from elsewhere in this regard, China
faces the challenge of creating its own model. In this case, a "joint-
committee" on universal service with members from relevant
government agencies at central and local levels as well as carriers'
central offices should be formed as an affiliate to the central regulator
to coordinate universal service activities. In so doing, however, China
can learn from the United States experience in dealing with central-
local relations on universal service. While the road towards the
eventual integrated regime may be long, the daily operation of the
present ongoing VAP can be delegated to relevant divisions of the
incumbent central regulator (i.e., MI) and its local counterparts (i.e.,
PCBs), meaning no separate entity is needed at this stage either.
The successful implementation of relatively independent regulation
in China also relies on addressing agency problems. It is particularly
significant to expressly re-define the government's role in the
emerging universal service regime. Agency problems can lead to
regulatory capture by interest groups, particularly when a "revolving
door" exists, which has been a pervasive phenomenon in highly
regulated industries' 0 ' such as telecommunications in China.
Although the central government is expected to play a leading role
in USO policy-making, substantial participation from local
governments is also crucial. Not only do local governments have the
role of stakeholders (e.g., local development, icon projects), but they
are also in a better position to leverage local resources (e.g., supportive
taxation policy). The imperative of local participation also comes into
play when taking into account how local areas may differ in natural
conditions and socio-economic development. With tailored
knowledge and jurisdiction, local governments may complement the
central government's capacities. Through "joint-committee," both the
central and local governments' roles in universal service can be
integrated into one unified platform.
101 See, e.g., George Stigler "The Theory of Economic Regulation," in the Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science, ed. Paul W. MacAvoy (Lancaster, PA: Lancaster Press
Inc., 1971), 3-21; Sam Peltzman, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of
Law and Economics 19 (1976): 211.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Chinese telecom sector has witnessed an exponential
expansion and growth over the last two decades, particularly since
deregulation in 1994. The deregulation resulted in a swift transition of
some ICT products, such as the telephone, going from a luxury to a
necessity for most people in China. However, basic telephone service
remains unavailable and inaccessible to a portion of the population,
particularly those in rural areas. This rural inaccessibility is emerging
as a serious challenge for China's government in its effort to bring the
sector and the economy to a new level of reform, one compatible with
the goal of a harmonious society and the Party's recent ideology of
building "Socialist New Villages" (part of which includes properly
addressing the "Three Agrarian Issues").
To address this pressing issue, China's government launched the
VAP in 2004 as an interim policy solution, according to which rural
connection tasks are distributed among incumbent carriers based on
revenue and geographical adjacency. The VAP regime serves short-
term goals but comes with its own problems, particularly due to its
unsustainable and inconsistent nature. These problems specifically
translate into insufficient support mechanisms and ineffective
regulatory governance which have proven to be hindering the progress
of universal service efforts in China. This necessitates a thorough
reexamination of the current universal service regulatory regime,
particularly when it comes to policy issues regarding the support
mechanisms, regulatory governance, and the definition of the
government's role.
Based on an investigation of the problems and difficulties
encountered by China's government with the ongoing VAP, this paper
offers suggestions on sound and reliable support mechanisms and
regulatory governance given China's unique institutional endowment.
The following conclusions are drawn:
" The uniqueness of China's circumstances requires a
unique solution to the USO issue;
* While a USF has been a standard and successful
mechanism elsewhere in the world, it is probably
currently unsuitable for China because of the high
perceived shadow price of public funds as well as
serious agency problems;
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Nevertheless, a regulatory approach featuring a
"non-subsidy" policy can serve both interim and
long-term goals when agency problems are properly
addressed in a well-designed governance structure
based on a "joint-committee" with members from
various stakeholders.

